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1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine the effect of a possibility of post-election information asymmetry
between voters and candidates on pre-election policy platform choices by candidates. We
show that this possibility leads candidates to over commit during the election campaign,
which may contribute to an ex post moral hazard problem.
Previous studies in electoral competition either assume candidates always keep their cam-
paign promises or that they do not. For example, traditional models of electoral competition,
such as the standard Hotelling-Downs framework, assume that candidates are committed
to their campaign promises (Wittman (1977), Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985), Groseclose
(2001)). Any possibilities of ex post information asymmetry problem is assumed to be non
existent, hence any possibilities that the winning candidate may renege on his campaign
promises is eliminated. On the other hand, some electoral models such as in Alesina (1988)
and citizen candidate models such as Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate
(1997) acknowledge the existence of the ex post information asymmetry problem between
voters and elected officials. Therefore, studies along this strain of literature assume that
the ex post commitment is not possible. Although these two strands of literature differ on
the assumption of whether or not the ex post information asymmetry problem exists, what
is common between the two is that these studies implicitly assume that both voters and
candidates know the ex post prospect of candidate commitment for certain (whether or not
candidates would honor his or her pre-election promises once elected).
However, given that the candidates are opportunistic, it is entirely possible that, during
the pre-election period, voters as well as candidates may not know the ex post prospect of
candidate commitment but only know the likelihood of such commitment.
Consider a candidate who promises a certain fiscal goal by restricting the budget deficit to
2% of the GDP. Implicitly, this is a promise regarding the efficiency of government operations
and scope of governmental policies. Suppose further that the personal preference of the
candidate is to actually increase state expenditures, therefore his platform commits him to
a more conservative fiscal policy than he would actually like. He would, of course, commit
voluntarily to win the election. If the candidate is elected and times are such that voters
can observe whether or not he kept his campaign promises, then the candidate keeps his
promise. However, there is also the possibility of an exogenous event beyond the control of
the politician such as a war. In this case, the war would bring certain unavoidable expenses,
so it is clear to all that the budget deficit will be bigger. The politician still could, in
principle, implement the same level of ‘other’ state activity that he promised before the
election. However, citizens often cannot observe which of the additional expenditures was
really war related and which was not. The problem with the observability of war spending
makes it unclear to the voters whether or not the candidate implemented his campaign
promise. This allows the candidate to essentially implement his most preferred policy.
In summary, what differentiates this paper from previous studies in electoral competition
is that in previous studies it is assumed that the post-election state of the world is known to
both voters and candidates (so the voters know whether or not the elected candidate would
honor his or her campaign promises), however, in this paper, we consider the possibility that
the post-election state of the world is unknown (so voters do not know whether or not the
elected candidate would honor his or her campaign promises). Voters and candidates only
know the likelihood of the post-election state of the world.
In order to address the unknown ex post prospect of candidate commitment in our study,
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we say that the ex post state of the world is normal if the state of the world is simple. In
such state, we say that the information asymmetry problem does not exist. Therefore, the
voters can observe whether or not the elected politician honors his campaign promises that
he announced during his election campaign. In the case of reneging, the leader must pay
a high political price and this entirely discourages such behavior. On the other hand, the
ex post state of the world is said to be non-normal if the state of the world is complex. In
such state, we say that the information asymmetry problem exists. In such state, cost of
observation for the voters may be very high, and therefore, such observation may not be
possible. Hence, reneging is entirely possible in non-normal state.
Under this setup, we show that when the ex post state of the world is likely to be non-
normal, candidates are more likely to make a bigger campaign promise on an issue than when
the ex post state of the world is likely to be normal. Therefore, we show that a possibility
of existence of ex post information asymmetry problem leads to candidates making bigger
campaign promises, hence the presence of potential ex post information asymmetry may give
rise to an ex post moral hazard problem. We also present previous empirical findings that
support this hypothesis.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the model of the two candidate
electoral competition. In section 3, we present the results of the model and provide a
discussion of the results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Consider a two-candidate, single-issue electoral competition where the candidates are policy-
motivated. Two candidates, Candidate A and B, are assumed to be a left-winger and a
right-winger, respectively. The median voter knows the policy preferences of both candidates
which are exogenously given. A policy is a number z ∈ R. During an election, the candidates
announce their policy platforms on the issue. The outcome of the election is determined by
the median voter who votes sincerely to maximize her post election utility. The candidate
who wins the election implements a policy.
We index the voters j = 1, 2, ...n. The voter’s utility over the policies of any voter j is
vj(z). We assume that (i) vj(z) follows a utility function with a unique maximum at some
value ẑj (we will assume that vj(ẑ) = 0) and is symmetric around the maximum, and (ii)
vj(z) is differentiable and strictly concave. Furthermore, we assume that the median of the
values of ẑj among the electorate is 0.
The candidates also have utility functions over the policy. Candidate i’s utility function
is ui(z) where i ∈ {A,B}. We assume that (i) ui(z) follows a utility function with a unique
maximum at some value yi (we will also assume that ui(yi) = 0) and is symmetric around
the maximum, and (ii) ui(z) is differentiable and strictly concave. Furthermore, given the
two candidates A and B, we assume yA and yB (in which they are determined exogenously)
are located on the opposite side of the median voter’s ideal point. That is, yA < 0 < yB.
The strategic choice in this electoral competition game are Candidate A’s choice of a
platform and Candidate B’s choice of a platform. These platforms will be denoted as xA
and xB. Candidate i ∈ {A,B}’s platform is interpreted to be a promise to implement policy
xi once elected. We denote q ∈ (0, 1) as the probability that the ex post state (a state
after the winning candidate is chosen) is normal. As discussed earlier, we say that the ex
post state of the world is said to be normal (q = 1) if the voters can observe whether or
not the elected politician honored the campaign promises he announced during his election
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campaign. On the other hand, the ex post state of the world is said to be non-normal (q = 0)
if such observation is not possible. If candidate i wins, he would implement the policy xi
with probability q and he would implement his own ideal policy yi with probability (1− q).
Therefore the expected payoff to any voter j given the probability of ex post normal state
q is,
Vj(xi, yi, q) = qvj(xi) + (1− q)vj(yi) + εi for all i ∈ {A,B}. (1)
where εi ∈ R is a candidate specific random shock that is normally distributed with the
mean at zero. This randomness basically implies that the election outcome is not only
determined by candidates’ election strategies but is also influenced by factors other than
what the candidates can control.
3 Results
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium platform choices of the electoral competition.
Given a choice of platforms (x∗A, x
∗
B) and q and yi for all i ∈ {A,B}, Candidate A wins the
election if and only if
V (xA, yA, q) + εA > V (xB, yB, q) + εB. (2)
Equation (2) provides the election rule, and it simply states that a candidate who provides
a higher utility to the median voter wins the election. Now, given the election rule and by
letting ε = εA − εB, we have
{(xA, xB)| ε > V (xB, yB, q)− V (xA, yA, q)}
as a set of equilibrium strategies in which Candidate A wins the election, and we have
{(xA, xB)| ε ≤ V (xB, yB, q)− V (xA, yA, q)}
as a set of equilibrium strategies in which Candidate B wins the election. Furthermore,
we will denote d = V (xB, yB, q) − V (xA, yA, q) where d simply measures a gap between the
median voter’s utility gain from the two candidates. Since the random factor ε is a continuous
random variable, the probability that Candidate B wins the election is
Prob(ε ≤ d) =
∫ d
−∞
f(ε)dε = F (d)
and the probability that Candidate A wins the election is
Prob(ε > d) = 1−
∫ d
−∞
f(ε)dε = 1− F (d)
where F (·) is a cumulative distribution function.
3.1 Candidates’ Expected Utility Maximization
Under the setup discussed above, Candidate i maximizes the following expected payoff by
choosing platform xi during election.
max
xi
qu(xi, yi)prob (i wins) + (qu(xj, yi) + (1− q)u(yi, yj)) prob (j wins) where i 6= j. (3)
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The first term in equation (3) measures Candidate i’s utility gain given the probability of
Candidate i winning the election and the second term measures Candidate i’s utility gain
given the probability of Candidate j winning the election.
Therefore, Candidate A maximizes the following expected payoff by choosing platform
xA
max
xA
qu(xA, yA) (1− F (d)) + (qu(xB, yA) + (1− q)u(yA, yB))F (d)
and Candidate B maximizes the following expected payoff by choosing xB
max
xB
qu(xB, yB)F (d) + (qu(xA, yB) + (1− q)u(yA, yB)) (1− F (d)) .
At the equilibrium platform choices (x∗A, x
∗
B), the following first order condition must be
satisfied for Candidate A:
ΦA = q
∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
(1− F (d)) + ∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
[qu(xB, yA) + (1− q)u(yA, yB) (4)
−qu(xA, yA)] = 0.
Similarly, for Candidate B, at the equilibrium platform choices (x∗A, x
∗
B), the following first
order condition must be satisfied:
ΦB = q
∂u(xB, yB)
∂xB
F (d)− ∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
[qu(xA, yB) + (1− q)u(yA, yB) (5)
−qu(xB, yB)] = 0.
3.2 Symmetric equilibrium
In this section, we examine an electoral competition where two candidates have symmetric
preferences around the median voter. That is, |yA| = |yB|. Although this assumption may
appear to be too restrictive, it is not altogether unreasonable. For example, in U.S. politics,
Republicans and Democrats are generally viewed as having symmetric preferences.
Lemma 1. Implicit Function Theorem Assume that the candidates have symmetric
preferences around the median, then there exists a continuously differentiable function x =
x(z) on an open ball B about z∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1. Assume that the candidates have symmetric preferences around the median,
then ∂xA(z
∗)
∂q
< 0 and ∂xB(z
∗)
∂q
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that, in equilibrium, when the ex post state of the world is likely to
be non-normal, candidates choose to make bigger policy promise by choosing policy positions
closer to the median voter and away from the candidates’ own preferred policies. On the
other hand, when the ex post state of the world is likely to be normal, candidates choose
policy positions that are more true to their own policy preferences. The intuition behind
this result is straight forward. When there is a greater likelihood that the ex post state is
non-normal, the chance of being free from keeping campaign promises is high, therefore, the
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candidates offer policies that are more appealing to the median voter at the cost of moving
away from their own policy preferences.
Several findings from previous empirical studies support this result. I present two exam-
ples here. The first example deals with issue complexity (simple v.s. complex). Carmines
and Stimson (1980) find evidence that candidates typically have unambiguously distinctive
policy positions on what is perceived as easy issues by the electorate. However, candidates
tend to take similar policy positions on what is perceived as hard issues by the electorates.
In their study, Carmines and Stimson defined easy issues as simple and symbolic whereas
hard issues are defined as complex and technical. As discussed earlier, when an issue is more
complex to understand, the ex post information asymmetry problem is more likely to arise.
Within our context, this implies candidates are more likely to make excessive commitments
during the election campaign and choose policy platforms that are closer to the median,
hence their proposed policy positions would be similar. On the contrary, when an issue is
relatively easy to understand, the ex post information asymmetry problem is less likely to
arise. Within our context, this implies candidates are less likely to make excessive commit-
ments during election campaign and choose policy platforms that are more closer to their
own preferred positions away from the median, hence their proposed policy positions would
be unambiguously distinct.
The second example deals with voter trust between local government v.s. federal govern-
ment. Several studies show that the public holds state legislatures to be more honest and
caring than the national congress (Newkirk (1979) and Jewell (1982)). Similar studies find
that local governments are also viewed favorable in contrast to the federal government and
city government officials are seen as much more honest than those in the national government
(Ulbig (2002)). The public feels this way because the public has more control over the actions
of elected officials at the local level (Dahl and Tufte (1973) and Diamond (1999)). Within
our context, this implies that the rise of information asymmetry problem is minimized at
the local level, because the public has greater control over the actions of elected officials. If
indeed voters feel distanced with the issues involving national government and has little or
no control over actions of elected officials at the national level, the information asymmetry
problem is more likely to arise. In other words, because national issues are more likely to be
complex than local issues, candidates are more likely to make bigger campaign promises on
national issues, making the moral hazard problem more likely to arise which in turn leads
to the loss of credibility of politicians.
4 Concluding remarks
In this study, we highlight the importance of ex post information symmetry between voters
and elected officials in a public choice sense. If political candidates perceive the future state
of the world to be more transparent, this would discourage candidates from making bigger
campaign promises, hence minimize the rise of ex post moral hazard problem.
One can easily extend our model to further the study on electoral competition. For
example, it is assumed in this paper that voters have full information about the candidates’
most preferred policies. Although it is not so unreasonable to assume that voters know
the candidates’ preferred policy positions, it would be worthwhile to consider a case where
voters have incomplete information about the candidates’ most preferred policy positions.
Furthermore, although some previous empirical findings are provided in this study that
supports our hypothesis, one could test the result empirically as a follow-up study.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let us first define a vector z = (yi, yj, q) for i ∈ {A,B}. In order to
prove Lemma 1, we need to show that the following partial Jacobian matrix is nonsingular.(
∂ΦA
∂xA
∂ΦA
∂xB
∂ΦB
∂xA
∂ΦB
∂xB
.
)
(6)
Now from the first order condition in equation (4), we have
∂ΦA(z
∗)
∂xA
= q
∂2u(xA, yA)
∂x2A
(1− F (d))− 2q∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
+
∂
(
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
)
∂xA
(qu(xB, yA) + (1− q)u(yA, yB)− qu(xA, yA)) .
With a simple algebraic manipulation (by multiplying xA to the equation above and dividing
it by xA) and applying the envelope theorem, we can rewrite the above equation as
∂ΦA(z
∗)
∂xA
= ΦA(z
∗)− 2q∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
< 0. (7)
Notice that from the first order conditions, Φi(x
∗
A, x
∗
B, z
∗) = 0, hence it is easy to see that
∂ΦA(z
∗)
∂xA
< 0
Similarly, we can show that
∂ΦB(z
∗)
∂xB
= ΦB(z
∗) + 2q
∂u(xB, yB)
∂xB
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
< 0. (8)
Also, from the first order condition in equation (4), we have
∂ΦA(z
∗)
∂xB
= −q∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
+ q
∂u(xB, yB)
∂xB
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
+
∂
(
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
)
∂xB
(qu(xB, yA) + (1− q)u(yA, yB)− qu(xA, yA)) .
Now, from the above equation, notice that
∂
(
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
)
∂xB
= 0, hence
∂ΦA(z
∗)
∂xB
= −q∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
+ q
∂u(xB, yA)
∂xB
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
> 0 (9)
Similarly, we can show that
∂ΦB(z
∗)
∂xA
= q
∂u(xB, yB)
∂xB
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
− q∂u(xA, yB)
∂xA
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
> 0. (10)
Given the Jacobian matrix in (6), for it to be singular, it must be that
∂ΦA
∂xA
/
∂ΦA
∂xB
=
∂ΦB
∂xA
/
∂ΦB
∂xB
. (11)
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Note that under the symmetric assumption, we have that ∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xA
= ∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
. Now, lets’s
suppose that indeed ∂ΦA
∂xA
/∂ΦA
∂xB
= ∂ΦB
∂xA
/∂ΦB
∂xB
(hence, the Jacobian matrix is singular). Then,
by applying the symmetric assumption, we have
2
∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
/
(
∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
− ∂u(xA, yA)
∂xB
)
=
(
∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
− ∂u(xA, yA)
∂xB
)
/2
∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
.
Given the equation above, the only way that the condition given by equation (11) can hold
is if
2
∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
=
∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
− ∂u(xA, yA)
∂xB
⇒ ∂u(xA, yA)
∂xA
= −∂u(xA, yA)
∂xB
.
This is a contradiction since
∣∣∣∂u(xA,yA)∂xA ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣−∂u(xA,yA)∂xB ∣∣∣. Hence, the condition given by (11)
cannot hold, and therefore, the Jacobian matrix is nonsingular.
Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1 We first establish that, under our setup, candidate’s equilibrium policy platforms,
x∗A and x
∗
B diverge around the median. That is, yA < x
∗
A < 0 < x
∗
B < yB. In part 2, we will
prove the result in proposition 1.
In order to show this divergent result, we first show that (x∗A, x
∗
B) is unique and bracket
around the median voter’s most preferred policy position.
To show that (x∗A, x
∗
B) is unique, consider Candidate i. Given x
∗
j , assume that at x
∗
i ,
EUi = EU
∗
i where i 6= j. Now suppose there exist |x′i| ≥ |x∗i | such that at x′i, EUi = EU∗i .
Then it must be the case that x′i = x
∗
i . If not, Candidate i is always better off choosing x
∗
i
because v(x∗i ) > v(x
′
i).
Now we show that candidates’ equilibrium platforms bracket around the median voter’s
most preferred position. We show this in four steps.
First, we show that x∗i 6= 0 for all i ∈ {A,B}. Now, suppose x∗i = 0. Recall that
d = qv(xi)+(1− q)v(yi)− qv(xj)− (1− q)v(yj) for i 6= j, and therefore, ∂d∂xi = q
∂v(xi)
∂xi
. Notice
that ∂v(xi)
∂xi
= 0 at x∗i = 0 (xi = 0 is the most preferred position for the median). Hence, at
x∗i = 0, the first order condition given by equation (4)
1 becomes
q
∂u(x∗i , yi)
∂xi
(1− F (d)) = 0
which is a contradiction since
∂u(x∗i ,yi)
∂xi
< 0. Hence x∗i 6= 0, for all i ∈ {A,B}.
Second, we show that x∗i ∈ R− for i = A and x∗i ∈ R+ for i = B. Let’s suppose that
x∗i ∈ R−. Also, suppose that there exists x′i ∈ R+ such that |x∗i | = |x′i| and without loss of
generality, we assume that ε = 0. Then, it must be the case that
prob(i winning at x∗i ) = prob(i winning at x
′
i).
1This is a case where i = A. We get the similar result for using the first order condition given by equation
(5). In that case i = B.
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However, since yi ∈ R+ for i = B, ∂u(xi,yi)∂xi > 0,
∂2u(xi,yi)
∂x2i
< 0 and ∂u(xi,yi)
∂xi
|(xi=yi) = 0,
u(x∗i ) < u(x
′
i).
This is a contradiction, hence x∗i /∈ R− for i = B. The other case where x∗i ∈ R+ for i = B
can be shown similarly, hence is omitted.
Third, we show that x∗i 6= yi. Suppose that x∗i = yi then, given the properties of u(·),
∂u(xi,yi)
∂xi
= 0. Therefore, the first order condition given in equation (5) can be rewritten as
−∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
((1− q)u(yA, yB)− qu(xB, yB)) = 0.
However, since ∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
> 0, it must be that
−∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
((1− q)u(yA, yB)− qu(xB, yB)) < 0.
Hence, it cannot be the case that x∗i = yi. The case where i = A is similar, hence is omitted.
Lastly, we show that, in equilibrium, |x∗i | < |yi| for all i ∈ {A,B}. Again, we show the
case where i = B and omit the case where i = A. Let |x∗B − yB| = |xBi′ − yB| and also let’s
suppose that x∗B < yB and x
′
B > yB, then u(x
∗
B, yB) = u(x
′
B, yB). However,
Prob(i winning at x∗B) > Prob(i winning at x
′
i)
Therefore, Candidate B is always better off choosing x∗B. Hence, |x∗B| < |yB|.
Part 2 Now for Proposition 1 to hold, it must be that
∂xA(z
∗)
∂q
= −
∂ΦA(z
∗)
∂q
∂ΦA(z∗)
∂xA
< 0 and
∂xB(z
∗)
∂q
= −
∂ΦB(z
∗)
∂q
∂ΦB(z∗)
∂xB
> 0.
Recall that lemma 1 insures the existence of a continuously differentiable function x = x(z)
on an open ball B about z∗ where z = (yi, yj, q).
We prove that ∂xB(z
∗)
∂q
> 0 here. Proof for ∂xA(z
∗)
∂q
< 0 is similar, hence is ommited.
Now first notice that ∂ΦB(z
∗)
∂xB
< 0, therefore we need to only show that ∂ΦB(z
∗)
∂q
> 0 to show
∂xB(z
∗)
∂q
< 0. From the first order condition given in equation (5), we have
∂ΦB(z
∗)
∂q
=
∂u(xB, yB)
∂xB
F (d) + q
∂u(xB, yB)
∂xB
F (d)
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂q
−
∂
(
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
)
∂q
(qu(xA, yB) + (1− q)u(yA, yB)− qu(xB, yB))
−∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
(u(xA, yB)− u(yA, yB)− u(xB, yB)) .
By multiplying q to the equation above and using the envelope theorem, we have
∂ΦB(z
∗)
∂q
= ΦB(z
∗) + q2
∂u(xB, yB)
∂xB
F (d)
∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂q
−q∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
(u(xA, yB)− u(yA, yB)− u(xB, yB)) .
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where we know ΦB(z
∗) = 0. Now, given the symmetric assumption,
∂d
∂q
= v(xB)− v(yB)− v(xA) + v(yA) = 0,
hence
∂ΦB(z
∗)
∂q
= −q∂F (d)
∂d
∂d
∂xB
(u(xA, yB)− u(yA, yB)− u(xB, yB)) > 0.
Therefore ∂xB(z
∗)
∂q
> 0.
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